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4

Transitional Justice as a motif, a discourse and a practice
continues to entice analysis from scholars, practitioners and
policy makers. It is a field that has rapidly expanded, and that
has both the fortune and disadvantage of being termed an
“industry.” The growth of transitional justice is both an
opportunity and a warning, as the challenges raised by massive
human rights violations and transitions from violence to peace or
from repressive regimes to more liberal ones continue to
preoccupy scholars and practitioners. Each new country specific
context facilitates revisiting old trade-offs and concepts revealing
new elements to transitional dilemmas.
In a collection edited by Melissa Williams, Rosemary Nagy
and John Elster entitled Transitional Justice, a substantial
attempt is made by a number of contributors to engage with
theoretical and conceptual understandings of transitional justice,
as well as to reflect comprehensively on the conceptual
dimensions of selected transitional justice measures. The book is
the product of the annual meeting of the American Society for
Legal and Political Philosophy, in conjunction with the
American Political Science Association, in 2005, but only

1. Professor of Political Science, University of Toronto.
2. Assistant Professor of Gender Equality and Social Justice, Nipissing University
in Ontario, Canada.
3. Professor of Rationalité et sciences sociale, Collège de France, and Robert K.
Merton Professor of Social Sciences, Columbia University.
4. Visiting Professor, Harvard Law School; Dorsey & Whitney Chair in Law,
University of Minnesota Law School; and Associate Director, Transitional Justice
Institute, University of Ulster, Northern Ireland.
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brought to publication in 2011. With a self-confessed theoretical
bent, vividly captured in the contribution by David Dyzenhaus
entitled “Leviathan as a Theory of Transitional Justice,” the
essay collection contributes to the on-going theorization of the
transitional justice field and there are some significant nuggets to
be pulled out of its pages. However there is also some patchiness
in the collection, with some variance in the strength and depth of
contributions and thus their overall conceptual cohesiveness.
The opening essay, “Theorizing Transitional Justice,” is by
Pablo de Greiff, the recently appointed United Nations Special
Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and
guarantees of non-repetition and practitioner of transitional
justice, as well as Director of Research for the New York based
International Centre for Transitional Justice. The essay is
derived from de Greiff”s reflections on the underconceptualized state of the field, his assessment of the limitations
of other theory-oriented contributions, as well as his own
theoretical contribution, seeking to cohere theoretical
approaches to the analysis of transitional justice. De Greiff
relays an emerging “common sense” around transitional justice
practice, which one can take to mean greater convergence
between all those engaged in writing and practice on the
contours, imperatives and dimensions of the field. His
preoccupations are driven in part by an identifiable frustration
with piecemeal or “pick and choose” transition, whereby states
and international institutions think that different parts of the
transitional justice “package” can be traded off against one
another. Instead he argues for a normative conception of
transitional justice, the contents of which are advanced in this
essay. In particular, he makes strong claims for relationships
between the constituent elements of transitional justice, yielding
in his terminology a “holistic” vision. De Greiff does so because
he argues that normative theoretical work can guide action, and
operate to make practical choices clearer or give their
problematic elements greater exposure. Essential to his task is
the identification of “two mediate goals, namely recognition and
civic trust and two final goals, reconciliation and democracy . . .”
(pp. 33-34). He frames his overall argument by the claim that
these four goals in tandem “[g]ive concrete expression through
law-based systems to the necessarily more abstract notion of
justice” (p. 34). De Greiff also attempts to mediate a middle
ground through the contradictory views of transitional justice as
comprising either “extraordinary” justice on the one hand, or
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merely constituting an untidy set of political compromises on the
5
other. De Greiff”s analysis devises some new and thoughtful
ground and there is both appealing turn of phrase and fresh
insight into well-trodden problems of addressing grievous human
rights violations in fraught political circumstances. He is
pragmatic on the limited reach of many transitional justice
mechanisms, operating as they do “in a very imperfect world.”
His claim to the value of understanding a variety of transitional
justice mechanisms (truth telling, accountability, reparations,
and memory) as inter-connected resonates with the challenges
that other observers make as to the restrictions that follow from
a singular approach to transitional work. This echoes the
selection of the negative relations identified by Elster in Chapter
2, as he pinpoints the challenges of undertaking one kind of
transitional measure (truth) with the balancing of another
(failure to identify wrongdoers or offer reparations) (p. 94).
A number of the chapters in this book take a highly
pragmatic approach to assessing the success or failure of
transitional justice as an entity or its constituent parts. In this
vein, Adrian Vermeule’s analysis of “Reparations as Rough
Justice,” which opens by rehearsing the philosophical and policy
objects to reparations, yet sympathetically suggests and explains
why “there is a widely shared intuition or complex set of
intuitions underpinning the persistent demand for compensatory
reparations programs” (p. 151). These intuitions are captured by
the deft insight that while rough justice may be broadly
indefensible, it is attractive only when compared to no justice.
Vermeule’s instincts here pair him closely with Elster in a very
pragmatic alignment that is readily identifiable to those
operating at the cold face of transition—namely that the perfect
transition is rarely available and that “[p]reference satisfaction is
not the yardstick by which ordinary people judge [in this case a
monetary award]” (p. 154). Vermeule’s analysis, though concentrating on reparations, speaks to a broader range of transitional
justice trade-offs, where many of the mechanisms available to
victims would not really be defensible according to “any firstbest normative criterion,” but that the “status quo is even less
5. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117
HARV. L. REV. 761 (2004). Notably, David Dyzenhaus’ contribution to this collection is
also framed by a skepticism that there is a “distinct field of inquiry” in transitional
justice, and that one should think of “transitional regimes as exceptions to our ordinary
theory of justice,” leading in his view to a third and doubtful premise “that the societies
in which most theorists of transitional justice live are the societies that transitional
regimes should aim to emulate in most respects” (p. 182).
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morally defensible, assuming that one can coherently speak of
comparisons and matters of degree in such things” (p. 154).
The preoccupation with reparations and compensation is
picked up in Debra Satz’s contribution, “Countering the Wrongs
of the Past: The Role of Compensation.” This essay has a pithy
and uncontroversial start, articulating the instinctive view that
individual demands for repair can vary, and “responses that
might be appropriate in one situation might not be appropriate
in another” (p. 129). The essay is mostly concerned with the
ethical and philosophical concerns that follow from the giving
(or receipt) of monetary compensation, and well as problems of
identification where the harm in question has been experienced
historically and is not a recent occurrence for those claiming the
harm. While Satz is certainty right in saying that the standard
welfare economist’s view of compensation is the one most
appealed to in many conversations about repairing historical
wrong, this reader was not convinced that in practice this is
where the gravest tensions lie as regards contemporary
transitions grappling with reparations. Indeed, a robust literature
and practice of group, communal, symbolic and developmentintegrated reparations is to be found in multiple sites
underscoring much greater innovation in legal and political
6
practice than the essay captures. Doubtlessly, in the context of
U.S. positioning relating to Native American or African
American slavery reparations the debate remains largely stifled
and concentrated on the sterile pros and cons of lump sum
financial compensation. Acknowledging that should not limit us
to viewing the theoretical space of monetary compensation
through the prims of these specific cases alone, or to frame other
cases out from them. Arguably, a slice of the innovative practices
and pragmatic choices being made in fragile and economically
limited post-conflict sites may have the capacity to circle back to
the cases that seem to underpin Satz’s analysis.

6. See, e.g., THE REDRESS TRUST, IMPLEMENTING VICTIMS’ RIGHTS: A HANDBOOK ON
THE BASIC PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES ON THE RIGHT TO A REMEDY AND REPARATION
(1996), http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/Reparation%20Principles. pdf; Ruth
Rubio- Marín & Pablo de Greiff, Women and Reparations, 1 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST.
318 (2007); Colleen Duggan et al., Reparations for Sexual and Reproductive Violence:
Prospects for Achieving Gender Justice in Guatemala and Peru, 2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL
JUST. 192 (2008); Brandon Hamber & Ingrid Palmary, Gender, Memorialization and
Symbolic Reparations, in THE GENDER OF REPARATIONS: UNSETTLING SEXUAL
HIERARCHIES WHILE REDRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 324 (Ruth RubioMarín ed., 2009).
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Satz’s essay undertakes some graceful analytical work in
addressing why the assumptions that individual satisfaction can
be aggregated into a single scale are misplaced. Here the
assumptions are misdirected not least because victims may view
their harms as incommensurable to other goods, that the
obligation to compensate disconnects in unacceptable ways the
wrong done from the wrongdoer, or that the relational nature of
the harm is not fully revealed by the compensation offered.
There is, whether in this work or other, some significant space
left to explore why and by what pathway symbolic and
communal reparations allow for satisfaction to victims in ways
that financial compensation does not. It is generally agreed that
victims need both practical reparations for and symbolic
acknowledgement of their experiences. Both are necessary to
achieve a cohesive, unitary and structurally engaged response to
harm. Symbolic reparations can undo stigma, remake citizenship
and social status, and provide a formal lasting testament to
deeply felt harm. But we should we wary of seeing symbolic
reparations as a full substitute for individualized monetary and
social benefits to victims. Tangible benefits without societal and
state acknowledgment marginalize the victim politically and
socially.
Moreover, any reflection on symbolic and group benefits
must also engage in a meaningful way with the intersectionalities
of victim status. There is a danger that by a failure to
disaggregate certain kinds of harms, we ignore the re-inscribing
of victim stigma in unexpected ways. These challenges are most
obviously in view as we assess gender harms and the reparations
that may follow to women as a result. Here there is an odd
circularity in that if the harm to be remedied is a sexual harm or
violation, it is premised in part on the presumed values of virtue
and purity for the female body and person in a given social
setting. There is self-evidently an autonomy and dignitary harm
to sexual violation but in some measure the stigma that is
remedied through symbolic recognition or compensation is
rooted in a measure of acceptance of social role and
stratification (all the more so in societies where marriage,
childbearing and social status are premised on religiously
mandated purity and mediated access to the female body). In the
rush to ensure remedy and reparation, we should also pay
attention to the side-costs, namely the affirmation of the very set
of values which, in part contribute to the causalities of harm, for
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example, to female bodies in highly divided or conflicted
polities.
Satz further explores the work of Janna Thompson and her
views of reparations as a form of redeeming intergenerational
ties and obligation (pp. 141-45). The time is well spent—and
affirms that the theory is one that deserves greater scrutiny by
transitional justice scholars broadly defined. Despite some
quibbles with some aspects of Thompson’s claims, Satz generally
finds attractive the notion that claims by later generations to
remedy, premised on the suffering and harms of earlier
generations, have currency, because these claims are understood
as “means to reestablish relationships of mutual respect among
persons and groups whose relationships have been severely
damaged by past denials of that respect” (p. 144).
The preliminary exploration here opens up as many
questions and it seeks to unwind. In particular, it begs important
process inquiries in how the determination of harms to be passed
on and harms that are left behind and forgotten within victim
7
communities come about. There are self-evidently internal
equities and inequalities in operation, as process of memory
preservation and absent memory are deployed to select out from
any particular traumatic moment(s) what is remembered and
8
held and what is not. These questions of selectivity are
importantly connected with the dynamics of “outsider-insiders”
in victims communities: what harms do groups and communities
extend collective ownership over and which may be excluded
precisely because the targeted victim is a marginal or demonized
figure (for example the violated woman, the GLBT victim, the
politically marginal)? Here the construction of historical
memory and its connection to reparations offers an opportunity
to simultaneously acknowledge the present memory and reclaim
the absent memory of the marginalized victims. Any such
process is likely a fraught one given the prerogatives of
communal ownership of historical and intergenerational
memory. A further challenge that emerges from the foray to
discuss intergenerational memory, is related to the relationship
that emerges between external political and “guardian”
communities to the successor communities that may lay claim to
7. Marianne Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory, 29 POETICS TODAY 103
(2008).
8. See Kris Brown, ‘What It Was Like to Live Through a Day’: Transitional Justice
and the Memory of the Everyday in a Divided Society, 6 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 444
(2012).
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the status of contemporary victimhood. A stellar example of this
kind of layered analysis is Allan”s exploration of the complexity
embodied in Palestinian memory for present-day refugees living
in Lebanon, identifying the ways in which there are perceptible
divisions between older and living embodiment victims of land
displacement (those who actually remember or experienced) and
subsequent generations whose identity is connected to present
political and geographical space, and who uncomfortably inherit
9
the ownership of the intergenerational harm. Framed within an
analysis of the instrumentalization of memory in the Shatila
refugee camp, the reflection explores the tensions between
“[c]ommemorative events [that] . . . consolidated nationalist
claims by the refugees . . .” but simultaneously occlude “from
view are the everyday forms of suffering experienced by
refugees and emergent subjectivities not conforming to the
10
communitarian ideals of nationalism.” The essay thus opens up
a wide and deep space for transitional justice scholars to tease
apart the intergenerational inheritance and to probe its
complexity and contours, both empirically and theoretically.
In a chapter that deals with the nitty gritty of transitional
justice at the cold face, “When More May be Less: Transitional
Justice in East Timor,” David Cohen & Leigh-Ashley Lipscomb,
assesses the success of transitional justice measures in East
Timor. The essay nicely frames its arguments in terms of the two
competing visions of transitional justice articulated in the
volume. On the one hand, Jon Elster’s contention that one
should not necessarily view each core objective of transitional
justice as “synchronous and complementary,” set up against
Pablo de Grieff’s theory of transitional justice that proposes an
holistic application of transitional justice measures, where deep
coordination and overlap is actively sought and valued through
the transitional phase. In situating their analysis in East Timor, a
post-conflict locale in which multiple transitional justice systems
came into play simultaneously, the chapter undertakes the
difficult task of applying the theory to practice. They make the
strong empirical claim that because of the peculiar circumstances
of the transition in East Timor, where sovereignty had largely
been ceded to the United Nations, it may be one of the best
situations to make meaningful assessments of an holistic
approach to the multi-pronged implementation of transitional
9. Diana Allan, Commemorative Economies and the Politics of Solidarity in Shatila
Camp, 4 HUMANITY 133, 136 (2013).
10. Id.
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justice measures. East Timor was a place in which there was an
intensity of investment in transitional justice measures. Their
core claim, borne out by a painstaking review of criminal
process, truth recovery process and other complimentary
measures, is that “more may actually mean less if scare resources
are dispersed rather than concentrated” (p. 257). In their view,
the addition of multiple transitional justice institutions, one
layered on the other, may not have led to better justice outcomes
(or perceptions) for victims, but produced unsatisfactory results
for many of the central stakeholders.
In the context of criminal trials, their pithy review of the
pitfalls of East Timor’s domestic prosecutions (the Jakarta ad
hoc human rights courts) show the undisputable challenges of
the lack of competence by local courts and legal actors managing
the application of international crimes (e.g., crimes against
humanity), but more tellingly illustrate how difficult it is for
justice institutions to let go of the institutional values inculcated
by the previous regime. This seepage effect profoundly limits the
capacity of successor regimes (or more directly their legal
institutions) to do justice for the crimes of the former. These
insights, while not entirely new, are revealed in fresh ways
through the working through of ideas in a specific site which
shows the precise effect on old institutions operating “new”
practices, the blockages by entrenched institutional elites little
affected by accountability for past violations, and the limited
reach of civil society and international organizations to
fundamentally affect outcomes. The message is sobering for any
undue optimism on the reach of transitional justice.
Cold face exploration is also in play in the sole empirical
contribution to the collection—the essay by Monika Nalepa,
“Reconciliation, Refugee Returns, and the Impact of
International Criminal Justice: The Case of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.” The essay is placed with a stated lacunae of the
limits of political science to clearly establish “whether and how
criminal prosecutions can contribute to what is arguably the
highest goal of transitional justice institutions: reconciliation” (p.
11
317). To answer that question the chapter employs the methods
11. Whether this lacunae is as deep as the author identified, with the recent
publications of large-scale comparative study of the relationship between criminal
accountability and rule of law, is an open question. See KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE
CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS ARE CHANGING WORLD POLITICS
(2011); TRICIA D. OLSEN ET AL., TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN BALANCE: COMPARING
PROCESSES, WEIGHING EFFICACY (2010).
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of empirical political science, analysing the distinct patterns of
refugee returns in two municipalities that were the site of
egregious human rights violations during the disintegration of
the Former Yugoslavia (specially Prijedor and Srebenica). These
two sites are chosen specifically because close analysis by the
author of the prosecution strategies of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
demonstrated different prosecutorial strategies in dealing with
suspected war criminals in both municipalities. The analysis is
well couched in the caveats that make sense—namely that there
may be other factors in play in both sites that inject or depress
the capacity to “do” reconciliation. There is useful and
important data findings in the study that deserve the attention of
international criminal lawyers and those interested in theorizing
from a legal perspective on supra-national legal justice. Her
conclusion that “the price of plea-bargaining in order to
reconstruct the chain of command and reach order-giving
perpetrators depresses reconciliation” though having an
instinctive (as well as empirical) quality is a valuable one (p.
317). That noted, the presumptions concerning reconciliation as
a valued or presumed goal of transition itself remain somewhat
under-tested in the analysis. Nalepa makes a nod to this
challenge in affirming the empirical difficulties in deciding how
to conceptualize reconciliation as a measurable empirical
phenomenon. Her view that the modest position of focusing on
the return of refugees itself as a measure of “reconciliation,”
thereby viewing return itself as fulfilling some measure of social
trust and cooperation across ethnic lines may be more ambitious
that the author acknowledges. Specifically, it presumes a set of
real choices for refugees, and that the absence of violence and
fear sufficient to return to a home (which may be a better choice
than a tent, or an inadequate crowded and shared social housing
provided as the mainstay of refugee resettlement) is tantamount
to some measure of social trust. As the rich exploration of
Kimberly Theidon, tackling the complexity of return and
community existence in the aftermath of Shining Path and
12
Peruvian state sponsored violence, reveals, living together in
the aftermath of deadly communal violence may be many
things—but it is generally not reconciliation.

12. KIMBERLY
IN PERU (2013).

THEIDON, INTIMATE ENEMIES: VIOLENCE AND RECONCILIATION
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CONCLUSION
The essay collection carries a cacophony of new and old
voices to the transitional justice conversation. Its value lies in the
nuance and reflectiveness of a number of the contributions, the
capacity to tease out word and concept in a painstaking and
thorough way. There are inter-disciplinary strengths and
communications of substance across disciplinary lines, though in
a sense that may prevent some of the best of the analysis being
fully heard within the terrains of the disciplines that would most
benefit from a diverse set of voices on the new and old
challenges of transitional justice.
For a diverse collection of ideas, one missing piece was the
absence of critical and non-mainstream voices from any of the
disciplinary contributions in the collection. There is much
greater expression of critical left, situated, post-colonial, site
specific and feminist voices to be garnered across many of the
disciplinary engagements with transitional justice than are
revealed in this collection. The majority of the voices represented here are those of the western / non-transitional “here”
speaking to the experiences and choices of the non-western,
“othered” there. The challenge is not only theoretical, but
compounded by the fact that an uncritical and narrowly liberal
conception of the transition directs our gaze away from the
cultural, material and geo-political sites in which transitional
justice practices have emerged. In simple terms, the sites
transitional justice most often engage are the exotic other of
locales, subjects, conflicts and repressions elsewhere (never in
the western “here”). The export of rule of law and transitional
justice discourse can reflexively deploy an uncritical, liberal, and
hierarchical positioning with little capacity to recognize its own
13
hegemony and privilege. Transitional justice discourse, in all its
standard forms and straightjackets, demands critical
interrogation. Specifically, seeing transitional justice as a form of
discursive colonization whereby its language and “tool box”
appropriate and codify knowledge in ways that exclude and
produce hierarchies of value through the course of political
14
transition should be recognized. A fully articulated postcolonial
13. On rule of law exports and the challenges for women in particular, see
Fionnuala Ní Aoláin & Michael Hamilton, Gender and the Rule of Law in Transitional
Societies, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 380 (2009).
14. See Christine Bell, Colm Campbell & Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, The Battle for
Transitional Justice: Hegemony, Iraq, and International Law, in JUDGES, TRANSITION,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 147 (Morison, et al. eds., 2007).

!!!NIAOLAIN-291-JUSTICEINTIMESOFTRANSITION.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

JUSTICE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION

8/12/2013 12:08 PM

91

challenge to the hegemonic reach of legal liberalism as repre15
sented by mainstream transitional justice has yet to emerge, but
any fulsome theoretical analysis should be cognizant of this
critique’s relevance. It is the absence of any such alternative
articulations to the subjective experience and conceptualization
of transitional justice that leave a distinct gap in an otherwise
generally erudite and thoughtful set of contributions.

15. For an early articulation of what such an approach would encompass see
Khanya
sela Moyo, Feminism, Postcolonial Legal Theory and Transitional Justice: A Critique of
Current Trends, 1 INT’L HUM. RTS. L. REV. 237 (2012).

